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“PROPERTY” IN THE CONSTITUTION:
THE VIEW FROM THE THIRD AMENDMENT
Tom W. Bell*
ABSTRACT
During World War II, after Japan attacked the Aleutian Islands off Alaska’s
coast, the United States forcibly evacuated the islands’ natives and quartered
soldiers in private homes. That hitherto unremarked violation of the Third Amend-
ment gives us a fresh perspective on what the term “property” means in the United
States Constitution. As a general legal matter, property includes not just real
estate—land, fixtures attached thereto, and related rights—but also various kinds of
personal property, ranging from tangibles, such as books, to intangibles, such as
causes of action. That knowledge would, if we interpreted the Constitution as we do
other legal documents, tell us just about everything we need to know about the scope
of constitutional property. Caselaw and commentary do not speak as plainly,
however, raising troubling questions about what “property” means each of the four
times it appears in the Constitution. In particular, some authority suggests that the
Takings Clause protects personal property to a lesser extent than it does real prop-
erty. The unjust treatment of Aleutian natives during World War II illustrates the
risk of giving constitutional property so peculiar and narrow a definition. This
Article describes the troubling inconsistencies that afflict the law of constitutional
property and invokes the Third Amendment, that oft-forgotten relic of the American
Revolution, to argue for giving “property” a plain, generous, and consistent meaning
throughout Constitution.
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INTRODUCTION: THE SEARCH FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY
In 1942, as Japanese forces swept toward the mainland, the United States
government forcibly evacuated natives from the Aleutian Islands off the southwest
coast of Alaska.1 In some cases, United States military officials pursuing a “scorched-
earth” policy razed entire villages.2 In other cases, the natives suffered vandalism of
their empty homes, destruction of their irreplaceable craftwork, and theft of their
religious icons.3 Most significantly for present purposes, a few of the Aleuts had
United States soldiers quartered in their homes.4 Though it hardly ranked among the
worst wrongs inflicted on the residents of the Aleutian Islands in the early 1940s,
that hitherto unremarked instance of quartering offers a telling example of how
constitutional interpretation affects real people. Why were the Aleuts not protected
against the trespasses of their own government? The Constitution plainly required
better control over the occupying forces and compensation for the property rights they
violated,5 yet it took decades for the federal government to admit to having maltreated
the Aleutians, apologize, and pay damages.6 These injustices might never have
occurred if federal officials had adhered to the bold, clear language of the Third and
Fifth Amendments. Alas, though, courts and commentators have cast great uncer-
tainty on the meaning of the term “property” as used in the Constitution. This Article
documents that troubling state of affairs and turns to the Third Amendment for help.
What does “property” mean in the United States Constitution? The word appears
four times in the text, at crucial junctures.7 Its definition steers the great machinery
1 G. Edward White, The Lost Internment, 14 GREEN BAG 2d 283, 294 (2011).
2 See id. at 297.
3 Id. at 297–99 (citing REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND
INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, 355–56, 359 (1982) [hereinafter
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED]).
4 PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 330 (citation omitted).
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6 For details of the wartime treatment of Aleutian natives, see generally, PERSONAL
JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, and White, supra note 1. The former text constitutes the
official report of the federal government and provides the basis for the compensation later
paid under the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands Restitution Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989c (2006).
7 See infra Part I (discussing the Property Clause of Article IV, section 3, clause 2, the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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of federal and state government. Yet it remains uncertain whether “property,” in the
Constitution, includes both real and personal property.8 If the latter, moreover, does
it include tangibles (such as cars or guns) as well as intangibles (such as future
estates or negotiable instruments)? The question of what “property” means in the
Constitution seems simple enough. The answer is not.
More precisely, the answers are not simple. Perhaps, after all, “property” means
something different each time it appears in the Constitution. A good deal of caselaw
and commentary suggests as much.9 Judging from the precedents, “property” means
one thing in Article IV, section 3, clause 2 (the Property Clause), another in the Fifth
Amendment (where “property” appears twice), and yet another in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.10 Though originalism bears little blame for these
innovative readings, it bears noting that to interpret the Constitution in light of its
public meaning at ratification would not guarantee uniformity either, given that
“property” arguably meant one thing in the late 1780s, when the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights were ratified, and another in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was ratified.11
It should give us pause that both major schools of constitutional interpretation,
living constitutionalism and originalism, deny that “property” has a uniform mean-
ing in the founding document of the federal government.12 In other areas of legal
interpretation, courts routinely favor the practice of giving one term the same
meaning throughout the same text.13 That sound principle would appear more
important in constitutional law than in mere statutory or private matters. If ordinary
Americans cannot trust the Constitution to speak boldly and true—if its words
instead twist and shade from clause to clause according to the hermeneutical wizardry
of robed judges and cloistered academics—the rule of law cannot fare well.14
8 See infra Part III (discussing caselaw and commentary that defines the word “property”
in the aforementioned four parts of the Constitution).
9 See infra Part III.
10 See infra Part III.A.–C.
11 See infra Part IV (discussing the problem of constitutional inconsistency).
12 See infra Part IV. 
13 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (relating as a principle of
statutory construction that, ordinarily speaking, “identical words used in different parts of
the same act are intended to have the same meaning” (citation omitted)); see also Helvering
v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87 (1934); Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United
States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
14 See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 796 (1999) (decrying
as “inherently exclusionary” theories of constitutional interpretation that require “intimate
familiarity with vast amounts of caselaw and the subtle arts of doctrinal analysis, or mastery
of history writ large and writ small, or fluency in abstruse political philosophy”). But see
Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Commentary: Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The
Trouble With Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 731 (2000) (“Amar’s assumption of
constitutional coherence is also descriptively implausible in light of the heterogeneity of the
Constitution, a document whose component provisions were enacted at different times, in
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Given its modest scope, this Article does not aim to remedy all the inconsisten-
cies that afflict the meaning of “property” in the Constitution. Instead, it focuses on
countering precedents suggesting that the Takings Clause protects personal property
less completely than it does real property. To that end, it invokes the Third Amendment.
The Third Amendment reads in full: “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in
a manner to be prescribed by law.”15 Logic and history strongly suggest that, in the
event of quartering, compensation would be due for any taking of any property,
whether real or personal.16 Quartering in violation of the Third Amendment would
merit damages, not to mention equitable relief.17 Quartering permitted under the
Third Amendment, moreover—quartering done in war “in a manner to be prescribed
by law”—would also have to provide for just compensation. The Takings Clause
makes no exception for war, after all,18 and the Ninth Amendment guarantees that
the enumeration of the right to just compensation “shall not be construed to deny or
disparage” other rights retained by the people.19 As a matter of pure logic, the Third
Amendment creates no loophole for the Law of Takings, and the right to just
compensation covers both real and personal property. It beggars belief, after all, that
those who suffer quartering would receive recompense for the loss of rents, but not
for food, furnishings, or other chattels lost to the depredations of quartered soldiers.
History gives us a bitter lesson on that count.
The surprising and tragic treatment of Aleutian natives during World War II
demonstrates the dangers of giving the term “property,” as used in the Takings Clause,
an unduly narrow definition. Far worse than quartering, those residents and citizens of
the United States suffered vandalism of their empty homes, destruction of their personal
effects, and defilement of their religious icons.20 Only years later did the federal
government, after extensive hearings, recant, apologize, and offer recompense.21
Though only belatedly and impliedly, the natives finally won the right to receive just
compensation, which evidently aimed to remedy not only quartering and other tres-
passes to real property, but also the destruction and theft of the natives’ personal
different circumstances, and for different reasons, and whose interpreters generally read
different types of provisions in different ways.”).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. III.
16 See Tom W. Bell, The Third Amendment: Forgotten but Not Gone, 2 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 117, 137, 148 (1993).
17 See id. at 146 & n.228.
18 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
20 White, supra note 1, at 298–99.
21 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989c (2006); see also Roy L. Brooks, German Americans,
Italian Americans, and the Constitutionality of Reparations, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH:
THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE 207 (Roy
L. Brooks ed., 1999); Bill Summary & Status, 100th Congress (1987–1988), H.R. 442, 
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d100:442:./list/bss/d100HE.lst:: (last
visited May 1, 2012).
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property.22 By compensating the Aleuts for the full range of losses caused by the
quartering of soldiers, modern lawmakers rose toward the standard set by colonial
Americans who, when legislatively regulating quartering, routinely provided for com-
pensation not just for lost rents, but also for personal property taken or destroyed by
troops.23 Viewed from the standpoint of the Third Amendment, therefore, the Takings
Clause does not and should not discriminate between real and personal property.
Plain language, logic, history, and simple justice demand that the term “property” as
used in the Fifth Amendment be given its ordinary and generous meaning.24
Herewith a guide to the Article that follows: Part I briefly reviews each appear-
ance of the term “property” in the Constitution, offering a reference guide for the
discussion that follows. Part II reviews “property’s” meaning in the law as a general
matter. In a simpler and, perhaps, better world, these two discussions would tell us
all we need to know about “property” in the Constitution, because its meaning there
would equate to its legal meaning elsewhere. As Part III details, however, caselaw
and commentary suggest a very different result, one in which the meaning of
“property” varies from place to place in the Constitution depending on the vagaries
of precedent and history. To remedy that troubling state of affairs in part, Part IV
invokes the Third Amendment to argue for giving “private property” in the Takings
Clause a broad and uniform definition. More work remains if we want to effectuate
a similar cure throughout the Constitution. Ultimately, however, and as the present
effort suggests, we should aim to give “property” its plain, present, and public
meaning, no matter where it appears in the Constitution.
I. “PROPERTY” IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
The word “property” appears four times in the Constitution and its amend-
ments.25 It appears once in the body of the text, in the so-called “Property Clause,”26
and three times in the amendments: the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment,27 the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,28 and the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.29 This Part briefly recounts each of these references
to property, providing a useful reference for the Article’s subsequent analysis.
Although this Part discusses context, it leaves a discussion of related caselaw and
commentary for Part II.
22 See app. § 1989c-4(d) (2006).
23 See Bell, supra note 16, at 137 (describing legislation passed during the Revolutionary
War by Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey).
24 See infra Part III.C (discussing varying interpretations of the Takings Clause).
25 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; id. amend. V (appearing twice, in the contexts of
procedural due process and takings); id. amend. XIV.
26 Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
27 Id. amend. V.
28 Id.
29 Id. amend. XIV.
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A. The Property Clause of Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2
Although “property” appears elsewhere in the Constitution, Article IV, section
3, clause 2 alone has won the moniker of the “Property Clause.”30 It reads, in relevant
part: “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States.”31 This provision became effective with the rest of the original Constitution
when New Hampshire, the ninth and last requisite state, ratified the Constitution on
June 21, 1788.32 As discussed below in more detail, caselaw and commentary on the
Property Clause has focused on the scope of federal power over real estate owned
by the United States government.33 Nothing in the plain text limits the Clause to real
property, however, and the term “other” arguably suggests a broader meaning.34
Furthermore, practical considerations suggest that Congress would need the power to
“make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting”35 not only federally owned land,
but also federally owned property, such as desks, tanks, or notes payable. The debate
on that point, discussed in more detail below, primarily turns on the question of
whether the Property Clause amounts to an all-purpose spending clause.36
B. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
In the first of two references to due process in the Constitution, the Fifth
Amendment guarantees, “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law.”37 The Fifth Amendment became effective on
December 15, 1791, almost three and a half years after the original Constitution,
after winning approval by three-fourths of the then-extant state legislatures.38 The
Clause evidently aims to ensure that no one will suffer loss of property absent
30 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 470 (1982) (identifying Article IV, section 3, clause 2 as the
“Property Clause”); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 535 (1976) (same).
31 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Perhaps significantly, or more likely not, of the four
appearances of the word in the constitutional text this is the only one in which it is
capitalized in the original. Id.
32 See Sol Bloom, Constitution of the United States: Questions & Answers, NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_q_and_a.html (last visited
May 1, 2012).
33 See infra Part III.A.
34 See infra Part III.A. 
35 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
36 See infra Part III.A.
37 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
38 See The Bill of Rights—The First Ten Amendments to the Constitution, NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/charters_of_freedom_7.html (last visited
May 1, 2012). The requirement that three-fourths of the states approve proposed amendments
comes from Article V of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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certain procedural protections. As discussed more fully below, however, a long line
of precedents has also read the Due Process Clause to protect substantive rights.39
C. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
After forbidding affronts to a variety of rights, the Fifth Amendment concludes
with the Takings Clause, which provides, “Nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”40 The Takings Clause became effective on
December 15, 1791, along with the rest of the Fifth Amendment.41 Only this appear-
ance of the term “property” in the Constitution is modified by the word “private.”
Though perhaps just a rhetorical flourish, that adjective arguably excludes public
property from the protection of the Takings Clause, meaning that the federal govern-
ment could condemn a state highway or park without paying just compensation.
Courts have effectively ignored that potential limitation, however, instead holding
that the federal government must compensate even for the taking of public
property.42 That interpretive question does not interest courts and commentators,
however, so much as questions about which sorts of property rights—or, what
amounts to much the same thing, which sorts of takings—require compensation. As
we will see below (and see criticized thereafter) recent authority and years of
ordinary practice give real property more protection than personal property under
the Takings Clause.43
D. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
The second of the Constitution’s two references to due process provides, “No
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.”44 Apart from focusing on states rather than the federal government, this
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause reads almost exactly like the Fifth
Amendment’s,45 and therefore presumably has the same goal of ensuring that no
one will suffer loss of property absent certain procedural protections. As with its
counterpart in the Fifth Amendment, however, and as discussed more fully below,
courts have also read the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
protect substantive rights.46
39 See infra Part III.B, D.
40 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
41 See NAT’L ARCHIVES, supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
42 See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984); United States v.
Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241–42 (1946).
43 See infra Part III.C.
44 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
45 Cf. id. amend. V.
46 See infra Part III.D.
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Despite the similarities between the two Due Process Clauses, they were not
ratified at the same time.47 Whereas the Fifth Amendment became effective along
with the rest of the original the Bill of Rights in 1791,48 the Fourteenth Amendment
won ratification in 1868, during the Reconstruction Era.49 Query whether that might
lead an originalist to claim that “property” means one thing in the Fifth Amendment
and another in the Fourteenth. Presumably, the answer would depend on whether the
word’s definition changed during that almost eighty-year span. With regard to the
meaning of “intellectual property,” as discussed below, it arguably did.50
II. PROPERTY, GENERALLY
What does “property” mean? Definitions vary, of course, but Black’s Law
Dictionary offers a fairly standard version: “That which is peculiar or proper to any
person; that which belongs exclusively to one.”51 It includes “everything which is
the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or
invisible, real or personal; everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes
to make up wealth or estate.”52 John Lewis, in his classic treatise on eminent do-
main, put it this way: “Property may be defined as certain rights in things which
pertain to persons and which are created and sanctioned by law. These rights are the
right of user, the right of exclusion and the right of disposition.”53 Unless “property”
comes with a limiting adjective, then, it covers anything of value subject to an
owner’s exclusive rights of use and transfer.
Written definitions will only get us so far in understanding the scope of “property,”
though. We can better understand it by examining reasoning from cases. Like most
legal concepts (indeed, like most concepts generally), the meaning of “property”
ranges from a solid core of paradigmatic examples to a misty border of mere analogs
and near-misses.54 Tangibles, such as real estate and personal moveables, come to
mind first and most naturally when we think of property. Indeed, laypeople may not
47 See Bloom, supra note 32; Constitution of the United States: Amendments 11–27,
NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_amendments _11-
27.html (last visited May 1, 2012).
48 NAT’L ARCHIVES, supra note 38.
49 Primary Documents in American History: 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
THOMAS, http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/14thamendment.html (last visited
May 1, 2012).
50 See infra text accompanying notes 57–59.
51 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “property”).
52 Id.
53 1 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES
52 (3d ed. 1909) (footnote omitted).
54 For a discussion of different methods of analysis, see generally ALBERT R. JONSEN &
STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY (1988) (defining and defending reasoning
from cases as opposed to analytical approaches to moral and legal reasoning).
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think of much else.55 Those trained in the law, after only a little reflection, also
include nearby suburbs within property’s territory, areas populated by intangible
rights, such as future interests and choses in action, mysterious to laypeople but long
familiar to common law courts.56
Still farther afield, at the far and fuzzy border of “property,” lie purely statutory
creations such as copyrights, patents, and welfare benefits. Because they lack the
imprimatur of custom, and fail to embody many of property’s defining features,
these positive rights arguably qualify as mere privileges.57 Consider copyrights, for
instance, which rely on a federal statute for their very existence, expire after a
limited time, and cover goods that, because they do not suffer rivalry in consumption,
do not even qualify as “private” to economists.58 Patents, which arise from the same
constitutional clause,59 submit to a similar critique. As for welfare, although the
Supreme Court mused in Goldberg v. Kelly60 that “[i]t may be realistic today to re-
gard welfare entitlements as more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity,’” it did not equate
the two.61 Instead, the Court merely held that welfare recipients facing termination
of benefits had certain due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.62
We can also understand property the way that a biologist might understand a
phylum or species—as something that fits within a taxonomy of greater and lesser
kinds. Viewed in that light, property includes two broad categories: real property
and personal property.63 Each of these two includes various subtypes, both tangible
and intangible. The law of real property governs not only solid things such as land,
buildings, and crops, but also future interests, mortgages, and other abstract rights
that touch and concern the land.64 Personal property includes not only moveable
chattels like cars and computers, but also intangibles like annuities, accounts
55 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 97–100 (1977)
(discussing lay conceptions of property).
56 See JOHN LEWIS, 2 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED
STATES 743–45 (3d ed. 1909).
57 See Tom W. Bell, Copyright as Intellectual Property Privilege, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV.
523, 531–32 (2008) (arguing that patents and copyrights more closely resemble statutory
privileges than common law property).
58 Id. at 523–24.
59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
60 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
61 Id. at 262 n.8.
62 Id. at 264; see also Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985) (stating in dicta that
hearings determining eligibility for food stamps must meet the same standard); Bd. of
Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (conjecturing that an employee of
a public university could have a “property” interest in his employment sufficient to give him
due process rights).
63 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1217 (6th ed. 1990) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 657)
(describing classifications of property).
64 Id. at 236–37, 1218 (defining “real property” and “real chattels”).
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receivable, and contract rights.65 As in biology, there remain disputed cases. For
instance, does copyright more closely resemble a form of intangible personal
property or a mere privilege, such as a welfare entitlement, that lives or dies by
statutory enactment?66 Still, though, a taxonomic approach to property shows both
a solid core of indisputable family members and a wide-ranging set of distant kin.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY IN CASELAW AND COMMENTARY
Judging from caselaw and commentary on the matter, the meaning of “property”
in the Constitution varies both from its ordinary meaning and from place to place
in the text. In the Property Clause, the word undoubtedly applies to realty, and
probably applies to most chattels, but arguably does not apply to money.67 In the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which courts largely
read in parallel,68 “property” reaches broadly enough to encompass welfare
benefits.69 In contrast, courts have read the Takings Clause to protect real property
more completely than personal property, suggesting yet another clause-specific
definition of the word.70 This Part reviews how legal authorities have interpreted the
Property Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Takings
Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, each in its turn,
to reveal the peculiar and fractured nature of constitutional property.
A. The Property Clause of Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2
Although the term “property” appears in other areas of the Constitution, Article
IV, section 3, clause 2 alone has earned the label of the “Property Clause.”71 It reads,
in relevant part: “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States.”72 What does “Property” mean here? Given that “Territory” describes
federal lands falling outside the boundaries of any state, “other Property belonging
65 Id. at 236–37 (defining “chattel,” “chattel mortgage,” and “chattel paper”).
66 For one view on that question, see Bell, supra note 16, at 524 (arguing that copyright
more closely resembles a statutory privilege than common law property).
67 See infra Part III.A.
68 See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 535 (1884).
69 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (holding that a discounting of welfare
benefits requires due process).
70 Compare Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031–32 (1992), with Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64–67 (1979) (finding that denying compensation under the Takings Clause
was unjust, because a regulation’s effect on the landowner’s property value was relevant).
71 See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 534 (1976); see also infra Part I.A.
72 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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to the United States” must include federal lands within a state, such as military bases
or the vast western tracts controlled by the Bureau of Land Management. On that
point, courts and commentators agree.73
Does “other Property” go beyond real estate to include personal property such
as chattels or negotiable instruments? Nothing in the plain text limits the term to real
property.74 Moreover, the addition of “other” suggests that anything fairly described
as “property”—real or personal, tangible or otherwise—falls within the scope of the
Property Clause.75 Practical considerations suggest that Congress would need the
power to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting” not only federally
owned land but also federally owned paperclips, chairs, or debt claims.76 Perhaps be-
cause it obviously holds true, however, courts do not appear to have tested that claim.
Indeed, the Property Clause has seen relatively little judicial interpretation.77
The most recent Supreme Court case to deal with it, Kleppe v. New Mexico,78 dates
from more than thirty years ago.79 Kleppe raised the question of federal authority
over wild horses and burros inhabiting federal land,80 facts that would appear ripe
for a determination of whether “other Property” in Article IV, section 3, clause 2
included chattels. The Court allowed that “it is far from clear that . . . Congress
cannot assert a property interest in the regulated horses and burros superior to that
of the State.”81 Ultimately, though, it dodged the question of the scope of “other
Property” and instead decided the case on the grounds that “the ‘complete power’
that Congress has over public lands necessarily includes the power to regulate and
protect the wildlife living there.”82
Anyone who, as part of his or her legal education cum hazing, has struggled
with the role that ferae naturae play in that old chestnut of a case, Pierson v. Post,83
can perhaps sympathize with the Court’s unwillingness to resolve the property status
of wild animals on public lands.84 The Court in Kleppe sat out that chase, simply
decreeing instead that the federal government’s power over its real property gives
73 See infra text accompanying notes 90–91.
74 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
75 See David E. Engdahl, The Basis of the Spending Power, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 215,
250 (1997).
76 See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 28 (2004).
77 John D. Leshy, A Property Clause for the Twenty-First Century, 75 U. COLO. L. REV.
1101, 1102 (2004) (“As constitutional provisions go, it has had a relatively tame history in
the courts.”).
78 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 533.
81 Id. at 537.
82 Id. at 540–41.
83 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
84 Id. at 179 (holding that property rights in a wild fox were acquired only by possession).
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it similar power over any ferae naturae found there.85 Kleppe thus does not reliably
tell us whether the term “other Property” in the Property Clause encompasses more
than real property.
Other court opinions do not appear to have asked the question expressly, much
less answered it. Litigation over the proper scope of the Property Clause has focused
on real property rather than personal property,86 giving judges little reason to
expound on the full scope of “other Property.” Granted, the Supreme Court claimed,
in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken,87 that “beyond challenge is the power
of the Federal Government to impose reasonable conditions on the use of federal
funds, federal property, and federal privileges.”88 The case did not implicate federal
real property, however, and the Court did not cite the Property Clause—or, indeed,
any provision of the Constitution—as supporting authority. Instead, the Court relied
on its own precedents, one of which raised Property Clause issues only to resolve
them via the same real property-based gambit employed in Kleppe.89 In sum, it
appears that judicial opinions have held that the Property Clause encompasses
personal property sub silentio, at most.
Few commentators have considered the question of whether the Property Clause
covers anything beyond real property, either; discussions of the Clause typically slip
immediately from the constitutional text to discussions of “federal land.”90 The most
extensive originalist analysis of the Clause—an entire article devoted to the
question—does not even consider the question of whether the Clause ever spoke of
anything beyond real property, concluding simply that “‘other Property’ was land
within the boundaries of a state, owned by the federal government, but not qualify-
ing as an enclave.”91
The commentary includes one exception to that lacuna: a minor academic
skirmish over whether “Property” in Article IV, section 3, clause 2 includes money.
The debate began when Professor David Engdahl argued that an all-purpose spending
power could be found, in part, in the Property Clause’s authorization of Congress
“to dispose of . . . Property belonging to the United States.”92 In opposition, Professors
85 Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 540–41.
86 See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the courts’ view of both types of property).
87 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
88 Id. at 295.
89 See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 22 (1952) (emphasizing that
Congress has power to regulate “commerce . . . upon any part of the public lands and
reservations of the United States” (citation omitted)).
90 Leshy’s article, for example, supra note 77, does not even use the words “chattel,”
“personal,” or “moveable.”
91 Robert G. Natelson, Federal Land Retention and the Constitution’s Property Clause:
The Original Understanding, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 327, 359 (2005).
92 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see Engdahl, supra note 75, at 243–57; David E.
Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 50–52 (1994).
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Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman argued that the Property Clause’s placement in
Article IV, amidst a “grab bag of miscellaneous provisions” rather than amidst the
express enumerations of Congressional power in Article I, demonstrates that it’s use
does not establish a general power to spend federal funds.93 They added that the
Clause’s reference to the ability to make “all needful Rules and Regulations respect-
ing” the property shows that it refers primarily to real property—hence the express
reference to territorial lands.94 Lawson and Seidman conceded that tangibles such
as filing cabinets and desks, so useful for administering government power, might
also qualify as the sort of property the disposal of which should adhere to “needful
Rules and Regulations,” but they concluded that “money is a much poorer fit.”95
To sum up their debate, Engdahl contended that the term “Property”—as used
in the Property Clause—means all manner of property, whereas Lawson and
Seidman contended that it covers only real and tangible chattels, with the exception
of money.96 We need not pick a winning side in their contest, however. For present
purposes, it suffices to offer the dispute as yet another example of how commenta-
tors have given “property” in the Constitution specialized definitions that vary from
clause to clause.
B. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
But for a focus on the federal government, rather than on state governments, the
due process provisions of the Fifth Amendment do not materially differ from those
of the Fourteenth Amendment.97 Courts98 and commentators99 have thus tended to
93 LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 76, at 28.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 For an interestingly parallel view of the scope of the Takings Clause’s coverage, see
Mark R. Jundt & Vernon R. Pederson, A Vexatious Problem Among Many: In Light of the
Conflict Between the Fifth and Sixteenth Amendments, Is Taxation an Uncompensated
Taking? 84 N.D. L. REV. 365, 371–72 (2008), discussed more fully infra note 113.
97 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V, with id. amend. XIV.
98 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 (2010) (noting that the
Bill of Rights generally applies the same standards to the federal government that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to the states); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954) (imposing
on the federal government under the Fifth Amendment the same standards of due process that
apply to states under the Fourteenth Amendment); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535
(1884) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause restrains states in the
same way that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause restrains the federal government).
99 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV.
885, 886 n.1 (2000) (calling the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “substantively
identical” to its counterpart in the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Ryan C. Williams, The
One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408 (2010) (arguing on
originalist grounds that the Due Process Clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
have different meanings).
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treat the two as identical when puzzling over the interpretation of their common
terms, among them the word “property.” In the interest of efficiency, therefore, this
Article discusses the subject once, under the heading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, below.100
C. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
Courts and other authorities have interpreted “private Property” in the Takings
Clause to sometimes speak more broadly, and at other times and more narrowly,
than the ordinary meaning of the phrase. On one hand, they claim that government-
owned property falls within the scope of the Takings Clause;101 on the other hand,
public officials need not pay just compensation when they outlaw, confiscate, or
destroy personal property.102 This section describes each of these paradoxes in turn,
amply demonstrating that the law has given “property” in the Takings Clause an
extraordinary meaning.
1. Stretching “Private Property” to Include Public Property
In United States v. 50 Acres of Land,103 the Supreme Court held that the Takings
Clause’s protection of “private Property” covered property owned by state and local
governments.104 The Court admitted that “the language of the Amendment only
refers to compensation for ‘private property,’ and one might argue that the Framers
intended to provide greater protection for the interests of private parties than for
public condemnees.”105 The Court nonetheless went on to hold that “private”
included “public”:
When the United States condemns a local public facility, the loss
to the public entity, to the persons served by it, and to the local
taxpayers may be no less acute than the loss in a taking of pri-
vate property. Therefore, it is most reasonable to construe the
reference to “private property” in the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment as encompassing the property of state and local
governments when it is condemned by the United States.106
We might well doubt the Court’s logic in equating intergovernmental transfers
with takings of private property, as well as the truth of the claim that a taxpayer feels
100 See infra Part III.D.
101 See, e.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984).
102 See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
103 469 U.S. 24.
104 Id. at 31.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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the loss of local public property as keenly as the loss of a home. We might likewise
doubt the 50 Acres Court’s invocation of United States v. Carmack,107 a case the
Court had decided nearly forty years earlier.108 In fact, the Court in Carmack merely
took note of the fact that the federal government had conceded its obligation to pay
for having taken locally owned public property.109 Because the parties did not contest
the claim, Carmack could hardly have decided it. The Court in 50 Acres thus had
only itself to credit or blame for giving “private” an extraordinarily broad meaning.110
In retrospect, following the controversial holding of Kelo v. City of New
London,111 we can see a sort of perverse logic at work in how the Supreme Court
reads the Takings Clause. Whereas the Court in 50 Acres held that the protections
afforded to “private Property” extend to public property, the Court in Kelo held that
“for public use” extends to takings for private use done “pursuant to a ‘carefully
considered’ development plan.”112 To the Supreme Court, in other words, “private”
includes “public” and “public” includes “private.”
2. Protecting Personal Property Less than Real Property
Ample authority teaches what the plain language of the Taking Clause suggests:
personal property enjoys the same protection under the Takings Clause that real
property does.113 The Supreme Court has defined the scope of “private Property” in
the Takings Clause very broadly, saying it includes “the group of rights inhering in
the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose
of it.”114 Courts have often recognized that the taking of personal property for public
107 329 U.S. 230 (1946).
108 See 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. at 31, n.15 (citing United States v. Carmack in support
of the passage quoted in the text above).
109 Carmack, 329 U.S. at 242 (“[T]he Federal Government recognizes its obligation to pay
just compensation for [the public property] and it is conceded in this case that the Federal
Government must pay just compensation for the land condemned.”).
110 Compare id. at 241–42 (noting the federal government’s obligation to compensate state
and local governments for condemned land), with 50 Acres of Land, 469 at 31 & n.15 (1984)
(interpreting Carmack as holding that just compensation principles for private land extend
equally to public land).
111 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
112 Id. at 478 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 536 (2004)).
113 See, e.g., Jundt & Pederson, supra note 96, at 370–71. But see id. at 371–72 (arguing
that money may fall outside the scope of the Takings Clause because it is a fungible asset).
The article goes on to argue that the question of fungibility is but one factor courts should
consider in assessing a potential taking, id. at 373–75, and that a tax that took thirty percent
of the value of an asset might qualify as a taking under the analysis of Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). That conclusion seems doubtful, though; Lucas involved a
taking of almost all of the value of the property in question—far, far more than a mere thirty
percent. See id. at 1006–07.
114 United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
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use requires just compensation under the Takings Clause.115 Relatedly, the Supreme
Court has also given “taken” a broad meaning, clarifying that it includes not just
cases where the government takes possession of private property, but also cases
where, by destruction, it deprives another of possession.116 Despite all of this,
however, the Supreme Court has given less protection to personal property under the
Takings Clause than it has to real property.
Does a taking occur when a government regulation forbids the sale of property,
thereby depriving it of all market value? Judging from Supreme Court precedents,
the answer evidently depends on the sort of property involved. The Court in Andrus v.
Allard117 grappled with that question in the context of personal property, and held that
no taking of personal property occurred when the Eagle Protection and Migratory Bird
Treaty Acts forbade the sale—in whole or in part—of legally captured gold or bald
eagles.118 “The regulations challenged here do not compel the surrender of the artifacts,
and there is no physical invasion or restraint upon them,” the Court explained.119 It
conceded that “a significant restriction has been imposed on one means of disposing
of the artifacts,”120 and that “the regulations here prevent the most profitable use of
appellees’ property.”121 The property owners complaining of the regulations could still
give away their chattels, the Court reasoned, and might even earn some economic
benefit from charging customers to view the now-unmarketable goods.122
Would the Supreme Court treat real property the same way? We do not have to
wonder; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council123 answered the question with a full-
throated “No.”124 Apart from the fact that it involved real—rather than personal—
property, Lucas bears a startling resemblance to Andrus. Like that earlier case,
Lucas concerned a regulation that effectively stripped the subject property of all
marketable value.125 Only the right to enjoy the property undeveloped or to sell it in
like condition remained.126 In that regard, the regulation at issue in Lucas burdened
115 See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (relating to interest
from IOLTA accounts); Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)
(relating to interest from inmate funds placed in trust); Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that “taking” of presidential papers requires just compensation).
116 See General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 378.
117 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
118 Id. at 67–68.
119 Id. at 65.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 66.
122 Id.
123 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
124 Id. at 1031–32.
125 Id. at 1007.
126 See id. at 1044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (observing that the aggrieved property owner
could still “picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on the property in a movable trailer,” as well
as “alienate the land, which would have value for neighbors and for those prepared to enjoy
proximity to the ocean without a house”).
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the property owner less than the regulations at issue in Andrus, which forbade sales
entirely. Unlike Andrus, however, the Lucas Court required just compensation for
so radical a reduction of property rights.127 In so holding, it emphasized that a taking
occurs whenever a regulation “denies an owner economically viable use of his
land.”128
It did not escape the Lucas Court that its holding stood somewhat in tension
with that of Andrus—that it had, in effect, created a two-tier Takings Clause.129 In
anticipation of such an objection, the Court observed that “by reason of the State’s
traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings,” the owner of
personal property “ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might
even render his property economically worthless,” and cited Andrus in support of
that claim.130 In effect, the Court held that because the government had, in practice,
so often disregarded property rights in chattels, they no longer enjoyed the full
protection of the Takings Clause.131 Many commentators,132 and at least one court,133
have found the Lucas Court’s distinction unconvincing.
Given that Justice Scalia, a self-proclaimed originalist,134 wrote the opinion,135
it proves somewhat surprising that Lucas did not address the question of whether the
Founders thought it appropriate to destroy the market value of personal property with-
out providing just compensation. Scholars have addressed the question, however.
127 Id. at 1031–32.
128 Id. at 1016 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
129 Id. at 1015 (differentiating a “physical invasion” and a “regulation [that] denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land”).
130 Id. at 1027–28.
131 See id. at 1027–28 & n.15.
132 See, e.g., STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 88 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing that
“[t]he implication that ‘personal property’ should have less protection than real property
under regulatory [sic] takings doctrine flies in the face of long precedent that both tangible
and intangible personalty are as susceptible to condemnation as realty”); Eduardo Moisès
Peñalver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for Landownership in Regulatory Takings
Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227 (2004) (exhaustively criticizing the Lucas Court’s attempt to
distinguish between the treatment of personal and real property); Joseph L. Sax, Property
Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1441 n.48 (1993) (calling the Lucas Court’s “distinction . . . between
land and personal property . . . one of the opinion’s least artful efforts”).
133 See Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344, 1352–54 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(expressing a belief that a taking of personal property can “be the subject of a takings claim”
under the Fifth Amendment if a government regulation deprives an owner of all
economically viable use). The court declined to find that such a taking had occurred in the
case before it, however. Id. at 1355, 1359.
134 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 38 (1997) (“What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a
statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.”).
135 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006.
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Professor Eduardo M. Peñalver concluded that “it seems unlikely that the uncom-
pensated taking of personal property was somehow less offensive to the Framers
than the uncompensated taking of land.”136 Most relevantly for present purposes,
Henry St. George Tucker, writing nearly contemporaneously with the ratification of
the Clause, surmised that it was “probably intended to restrain the arbitrary and
oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the army, and other public uses, by
Impressment, as was too frequently practiced during the revolutionary war, without
any compensation whatever.”137 The Founders meant for the Takings Clause to
remedy not so much the taking of real property as the taking of personal property
by quartered troops.
The Lucas Court relied on Andrus for the claim that personal property merits
less protection under the Takings Clause than real property does. It bears noting,
however, that Andrus did not go as far as prior courts had in derogating the right to
receive just compensation for takings of chattels.138 Consider the 1924 case of
Everard’s Breweries v. Day,139 which questioned the constitutionality of regulations
forbidding not just the sale of previously legal liquor, but also the transport or
possession thereof.140 Does so complete a destruction of a property’s value constitute
a compensable taking? The Everard Court summarily dismissed the notion: “It cannot
be said that [Congressional] action in this respect violated any personal rights of the
appellants protected by the Constitution. That it did not take their property in vio-
lation of the Fifth Amendment, is clear.”141 The Court offered nothing more by way
of analysis, but earlier cases upholding prohibitions on the use or enjoyment of liquor
under the guise of the police power had already, evidently, settled the question.142
Notwithstanding claims that the Takings Clause protects all forms of property,
therefore, and notwithstanding the text’s blanket reference to “private Property,” the
Supreme Court has failed to extend to personal property the same rights that it
recognizes in real property. Perhaps we could reframe that unequal treatment as not
so much a question of the meaning of “property” as of “taking,” explaining that
136 Peñalver, supra note 132, at 249.
137 1 HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 305–06 (The Lawbook
Exchange, Inc. 2008) (1803); see also Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1122–23
(1993) (arguing that “the appropriation of private, and, presumably, personal, property to supply
the army during the Revolutionary War” numbered among the “paradigm[atic] case[s]” of
government misbehavior that the Founders meant for the Takings Clause to remedy).
138 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66–68 (1979) (holding, instead, that there was simply
no taking).
139 265 U.S. 545 (1924).
140 Id.
141 Id. at 563.
142 See, e.g., Jacob Ruppert, Inc. v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264 (1920) (affirming the police
power of a state under the Volstad Act); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (affirming
a conviction under the prohibition statute as a valid exercise of police power).
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while the Court fully recognizes the ontological status of personal property, it dec-
lines to regard the total destruction of the market value of personal property (as
opposed to the total destruction of the market value of real property) as an actionable
taking. Focusing on “taking” rather than the term “property” makes little difference
as a practical matter, however, and, at all events, simply shifts the problem of
discriminatory interpretation a few words away. After all, nothing in the term
“taking” supports the distinction, developed by courts, between permitting the
uncompensated destruction of economic value in the case of personal property and
forbidding it in the case of real property.143 For all intents and purposes, then,
according to the Supreme Court, “private Property” in the Takings Clause embraces
personal property less completely than it does real property.
D. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
The Supreme Court has given “property” in the Fourteenth Amendment a very
broad definition.144 By its own account, “The Court has . . . made clear that the
property interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual
ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.”145 How far beyond? The Supreme
Court summed up its decisions in the area with the explanation that, “[t]o have a
property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need
or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must,
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”146 Alas for clarity, however,
that formulation defines “property” in a circular manner, in effect saying that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects entitlement claims that the
Court recognizes as legitimate. It leaves unanswered the crucial question: What
marks such claims as legitimate?
No one seems to doubt that common law rights to real and personal property
enjoy Fourteenth Amendment protection. “It is a purpose of the ancient institution
of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives,
reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined,”147 the Supreme Court explained.
143 In fact, the unequal treatment of personal property goes farther than that, as courts have
declined to order just compensation even when governments exercise their police powers to
prohibit all use and enjoyment of personal property, a restriction on property rights that goes
far beyond those classified as a taking in Lucas. See, e.g., supra note 142.
144 See supra Part III.B. The discussion in this Part of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause applies equally to the nearly identical language of the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, a parallelism supported by caselaw and commentary.
145 Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1972) (holding that
interest in re-employment under a year-to-year contract did not merit protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
146 Id. at 577.
147 Id.
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The Court has taken “property” in the Fourteenth Amendment far beyond its
traditional boundaries, however.
With reasonable reliance on an entitlement as the test, the Supreme Court has
held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects welfare
benefits,148 tenured employment,149 and employment under an implied promise of
continuation.150 “The procedural component of the Due Process Clause does not
protect everything that might be described as a ‘benefit,’” the Court cautioned in
Town of Castle Rock.151 More specifically, “a benefit is not a protected entitlement
if government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.”152 Nor does the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection for property apply “when the identity of the
alleged entitlement is vague,”153 or if it lacks “ascertainable monetary value.”154
Despite those caveats, however, “property” in the Fourteenth Amendment still
covers a great deal more than it does elsewhere in the law.
In defense of extending the Fourteenth Amendment to rights won under a
contract of employment, courts long ago recognized that contract rights may win
protection under the Takings Clause.155 “[A] contract is property, and, like any other
property, may be taken under condemnation proceedings for public use. Its condem-
nation is of course subject to the rule of just compensation,” the Supreme Court has
observed.156 Welfare benefits represent a different matter, however. The Supreme
Court could not cite law developed under the Fifth Amendment when, in Goldberg
v. Kelly,157 it held that a state could not terminate welfare benefits without satisfying
due process of law.158
The Goldberg Court justified its broad reading of the Fourteenth Amendment
in terms of principles rather than text. “Such benefits are a matter of statutory
entitlement for persons qualified to receive them. Their termination involves state
action that adjudicates important rights,”159 the Court explained. The text of the
148 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
149 Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
150 Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
151 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 763.
154 Id. at 766 (quoting Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86
VA. L. REV. 885, 964 (2000)).
155 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 88–89 (1985) (analyzing caselaw in support of the proposition that the Takings
Clause covers contract rights).
156 Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 690 (1897) (citation
omitted); see also Omnia Commercial Co., Inc. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508 (1923)
(“The contract in question was property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment . . . and
if taken for public use the Government would be liable.” (citations omitted)).
157 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
158 Id.
159 Id. at 262 (footnote omitted).
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Fourteenth Amendment refers not to “important rights,” however, but to “property”
rights.160 Do welfare benefits really qualify as such? The Court avoided that prickly
question, instead raising a different and rather easier one. “The constitutional
challenge cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are ‘a
“privilege” and not a “right,”’” said the Court.161 That hardly suffices to show
welfare benefits equate to property, though, given that something can qualify as a
right—the right to a jury trial, for instance162—and yet still not qualify as property.163
At the same time that it shied away from grappling with the plain text of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Goldberg Court did not go quite so far as equating
welfare rights with “property.” That would have proven controversial. Beyond
inducing dependence on its continuation, welfare has few property-like features.
Would-be welfare recipients cannot simply demand or purchase the right to
benefits; rather, they must apply for permission to receive them, and neither federal
nor state law permits welfare benefits to be divided, transferred, or bequeathed like
ordinary property.164
Rather than simply calling welfare benefits “property,” therefore, the Goldberg
Court limited itself to opining, “It may be realistic today to regard welfare
entitlements as more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’”165 Justice Black, dissenting,
accused the majority of juridical legerdemain: “It somewhat strains credulity to say
that the government’s promise of charity to an individual is property belonging to
that individual when the government denies that the individual is honestly entitled
to receive such a payment.”166
160 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
161 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969)).
162 See Margaret Talkington, A First Amendment Theory for Protecting Attorney Speech,
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 27, 61 (2011) (stating that the right to jury trial is one of the “core
rights” implicated in due process).
163 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262.
164 See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to
Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 286 (1995) (“[T]he welfare state restricts the alienation of
welfare benefits—in effect, by making them illiquid, discouraging their use for idiosyncratic
purposes.”); Carlos Manuel Vàzquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity? 106 YALE
L.J. 1683, 1752 (1997) (describing the right to continued welfare payments as “not-freely-
alienable”). Just as states generally disburse welfare benefits, so too do they regulate the
alienability of those benefits. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11002 (West 2011) (“All
aid given under a public assistance program shall be absolutely inalienable by any
assignment, sale, or otherwise.”).
165 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8. In support of that claim, the Court cited then–cutting-
edge legal research: Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965). Nowhere, though, does Reich’s article equate
welfare benefits with property rights.
166 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 275 (Black, J., dissenting).
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At all events, despite the pioneering holding of Goldberg, the case may repre-
sent something of a dead letter today. Some decades after the decision, federal
lawmakers stipulated that the provision of welfare benefits “shall not be interpreted
to entitle any individual or family to assistance under any State program funded
under this part.”167 That provision evidently aimed at denying welfare recipients
good claim to reasonably relying on the continuation of benefits, thereby arguably
obviating due process claims based on the modification or denial of federally funded
welfare benefits.168 On that view, Goldberg remains good but ineffectual law, and
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause still, in theory, includes govern-
ment benefits under the heading of “property.”169
Before closing out this discussion about the meaning of “property” in the
Fourteenth Amendment, it bears noting that some authority claims that the Due
Process Clause includes not simply one extraordinarily broad definition of the word,
but rather two different meanings, depending on whether procedural due process or
substantive due process is at issue.170 Our discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment
has thus far focused on procedural due process—a context in which, as Professor
Thomas Merrill has phrased it, courts protect property-as-entitlement.171 Merrill
argues, however, that when due process functions in its substantive capacity, it
protects a different conception of property—one that includes “everything relevant
to calculating a person’s material wealth or net worth.”172 He confesses that it
remains difficult “to flesh out this conception with a more specific definition,” as
substantive due process itself resists a neat description.173
Merrill’s argument for reading two meanings of “property” into the Fourteenth
Amendment offers yet another example of how cases and commentary risk inter-
preting the word in ways that take it farther and farther from its ordinary meaning.
Given the interpretive variations described in this Part, one might fairly say that four
appearances of “property” in the Constitution generate five distinct meanings. So
baroque a reading of the Constitution does not conduce well to the rule of law. The
next Part describes this problem and suggests interpreting “property,” and the rest
of the words of the Constitution, according to their plain, present, public meanings.
167 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (2006).
168 See Sylvia A. Law, Review Essay, Ending Welfare as We Know It, 49 STAN. L. REV.
471, 487 (1997) (reviewing five texts) (“While Congress has abolished the concept of
‘entitlement’ at the federal level, it is not yet clear what this will mean in terms of poor
people’s ability to obtain due process when their benefits are terminated.” (footnote
omitted)). But see Carolyn Goodwin, Comment, “Welfare Reform” and Procedural Due
Process Protections: The Massachusetts Example, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 565, 572–74 (2000)
(arguing that due process protections continue to apply at the state level).
169 See, e.g., Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 969 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting a due
process claim founded on cancellation of fishing rights).
170 See infra notes 171–72.
171 Merrill, supra note 99, at 960–68.
172 Id. at 982.
173 Id. at 983.
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IV. THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL INCONSISTENCY
As the prior Part detailed, courts and commentators have given “property” in the
Constitution peculiarly specialized definitions, and ones that vary from place to
place within the document. On the very face of it, this seems problematic. The rule of
law demands that we generally interpret words in statutes,174 contracts,175 and deeds176
according to their plain meanings, so that they will remain accessible to the ordinary
people allegedly bound by those words. That same rationale arguably applies with even
greater force to that most public and powerful of legal documents the Constitu-
tion.177 As Justice Souter colorfully put it, “[P]lain text is the Man of Steel” in fights
over legal meaning.178 “An argument rooted in the text of a constitutional provision
may not be guaranteed of carrying the day, but insubstantiality is not its failing.”179
Notably, Justice Souter voiced his paean to plain meaning in a dissent.180 The
Supreme Court does not always speak or act in a manner consistent with his well-
founded views, concededly; appeals to plain language often appear in dissents or
concurrences that chide other justices for adopting unduly esoteric readings of the
text.181 “As its prior cases clearly show,” Justice White once observed with approval,
174 See, e.g., Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004); Union Bank v. Wolas,
502 U.S. 151, 155–56 (1991); Bell v. Casper, 717 S.E.2d 783, 786 (Va. 2011) (“[w]hen the
language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that language.”
(citation omitted)).
175 See, e.g., Rains v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 523 N.W.2d 506, 509 (Neb. 1994)
(explaining that a contract’s “terms are to be accorded their plain and ordinary meaning as
ordinary, average, or reasonable persons would understand them”); Alexander v. Buckeye
Pipe Line Co., 374 N.E.2d 146, 150 (Ohio 1978), superseded by statute on other grounds
(explaining that, ordinarily, “common words appearing in a written instrument are to be
given their plain and ordinary meaning.” (internal citation omitted)).
176 See, e.g., McAbee Constr., Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1431, 1435 (Fed. Ct. App.
1996) (treating a deed for an easement as indistinguishable from a contract and explaining,
“We begin with the plain language”).
177 See Tom W. Bell, Graduated Consent in Contract and Tort Law: Toward a Theory of
Justification, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 17, 71–83 (2010) (arguing for interpreting the
Constitution according to its plain, present, public meaning).
178 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 n.13 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 344 (1967) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (appealing to the plain meaning of the Supremacy Clause); Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219–21 (1954) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that the case should be reargued
in order to address concerns that the sculpture did not fall within the scope of “Writings” in
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 79 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(complaining that the majority’s interpretation “is unauthorized by the Constitution if its
words be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning”); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,
144 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting) (citing prior authority in support of the plain meaning of
the Contracts Clause).
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“this Court does not subscribe to the simplistic view that constitutional interpretation
can possibly be limited to the ‘plain meaning’ of the Constitution’s text.”182
The Supreme Court pays homage to plain meaning often enough, however, to
support the view that the same rules that apply to statutes generally also apply to that
ur-statute, the Constitution.183 In either case, as Karl N. Llewellyn put it in his famous
catalog of canons of construction, “Words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning
unless they are technical terms or words of art.”184 It should, thus, at least raise
eyebrows when—as with regard to the cribbed meaning of “property” in the Takings
Clause185 or the expansive meaning of “property” in the Fourteenth Amendment186—
constitutional property does not equate to ordinary property.
As a corollary, it should also trouble us that the definition of “property” varies
from spot to spot in the Constitution.187 If ordinary meaning serves as our lodestar,
after all, we would expect it to stay North no matter where we travel in the document.
Canons of construction demand likewise, as they teach that we should presume that
repeated occurrences of a word within the same legal document have a uniform
meaning throughout.188 There is, as the Supreme Court said in Atlantic Cleaners &
Dyers v. United States,189 “a natural presumption that identical words used in
different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”190 Llewellyn
put it this way: “The same language used repeatedly in the same connection is
presumed to bear the same meaning throughout the statute.”191
182 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 789
(1986) (White, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
183 See, e.g., Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 441 (1987) (justifying its reading of
Art. I, § 8, cl. 14 as the “plain meaning” of the text); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 374
(1921) (adopting the plain meaning of Article V); Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311,
318 (1843) (observing of the Contracts Clause, “[I]t would but ill become this court, under
any circumstances, to depart from the plain meaning of the words used”); United States v.
Ortega, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467, 469 (1826) (disposing of an issue pertaining to Art. III, § 2,
cl. 1 on grounds that “this is not a case affecting a public minister, within the plain meaning
of the constitution”).
184 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Constructed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 404 (1950)
(footnote omitted).
185 See supra Part III.C.
186 See supra Part III.D.
187 See Amar, supra note 14, at 796 (suggesting that preserving the consistency of
constitutional terms from spot to spot in the document promotes “democratic virtues”).
188 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (citing the “normal rule of stat-
utory construction that ‘identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to
have the same meaning’” (quoting Sorenson v. Sec’y of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986)).
189 286 U.S. 427(1932)
190 Id. at 433.
191 Llewellyn, supra note 184, at 404 (footnote omitted).
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Although it appears problematic that courts and commentators have given
constitutional property meanings inconsistent with ordinary usage and from place
to place in the text, this does not end the inquiry. Perhaps, after all, we can excuse
those facial wrongs as cases special enough to overcome the presumptions in favor
of ordinary and uniform meaning.192 As Llewellyn famously pointed out, every
canon of construction has its counterpart; “Hence there are two opposing canons on
almost every point.”193 Against the presumption of ordinary meaning, in particular,
he set up this counter-canon: “Popular words may bear a technical meaning and
technical words may have a popular signification and they should be so construed
as to agree with evident intention or to make the statute operative.”194 The presump-
tion in favor of uniformity “will be disregarded where it is necessary to assign
different meanings to make the statute consistent,”195 Llewellyn explained. The
Court in Atlantic Cleaners gave the excuse a slightly different twist, focusing on
context, when it said that the presumption in favor of uniformity “readily yields
whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are used as
reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of
the act with different intent.”196
What Llewellyn did not point out so clearly, however, is that these dueling
canons do not meet on a level playing field.197 Instead, we ordinarily presume that
a legal document speaks in ordinary and uniform terms, leaving the burden of proof
on those who would urge technical and variable meanings.198 Query, then, whether
“property” must mean something other than its ordinary meaning—must not include
cash in the Property Clause,199 must not fully embrace chattels in the Takings Clause,200
or must reach as far as welfare benefits in the Fourteenth Amendment201—in order
192 See Merrill, supra note 99, at 956 (“[A]lthough legal interpreters should resist
attributing multiple meanings to the same word in a single document, there are contexts
where this may be unavoidable, at least if our objective is to accommodate settled doctrine
and to reach results that are normatively defensible.”).
193 Llewelyn, supra note 184, at 401.
194 Id. at 404.
195 Id.
196 Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
197 He does, however, concede that the ultimate selling point for adopting a particular canon
in a given instance is to win “a simple construction . . . by tenable means,” Llewellyn, supra
note 184, at 401, a test that supports presumptions in favor of ordinary and uniform meaning.
198 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242–45 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Indep. Petrochemcial Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 944 F.2d 940, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
199 See supra Part III.A (discussing caselaw and commentary pertaining to the meaning
of “property” in the Property Clause).
200 See supra Part III.C.1–2 (discussing caselaw and commentary pertaining to the
meaning of “property” in the Takings Clause).
201 See supra Part III.D (discussing caselaw and commentary pertaining to the meaning
of “property” in the Fourteenth Amendment).
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“to agree with evident intention or to make the [Constitution] operative” (to para-
phrase Llewellyn’s exception to the meaning rule).202 Suffice it to say for now that
neither this survey of the plain text and the context of the four appearances of the
term “property” in the Constitution,203 nor the caselaw and commentary interpreting
the word, give convincing reasons for overturning the presumptions in favor of
ordinary and uniform meaning.204
If we find fault with the way that courts have given constitutional “property”
extraordinary and inconsistent meanings, we can fairly blame the interpretative
theory that judges should read the text loosely and favor their own precedents over
plain meaning.205 Originalism does not seem to have had much effect on the caselaw
pertaining to constitutional property, at any rate.206 That is not to say, however, that
judges devoted to reading the Constitution according to its public meaning at the
time of ratification would necessarily have settled on the present meaning of “pro-
perty” or on the same meaning for every appearance of the word in the Constitution.
After all, the meaning of “property” might have changed since ratification or in the
years between the ratification of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.207
Consider copyrights and patents, for instance. Because they exist solely because
of federal legislation, first enacted in 1790,208 copyrights and patents were probably
not on the Founders’ minds when they ratified the Bill of Rights. Indeed, those statutory
privileges did not even win the appellation of “property” in American legal usage
before the mid-1800s.209 From a purely originalist point of view, then, older uses of
“property” in the Constitution—in the Property Clause, the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, and the Takings Clause—do not include copyrights and patents,
whereas the Fourteenth Amendment’s more recent reference to “property,” dating
from 1868, arguably does.210 Furthermore, if originalism assigns different meanings
to the various appearances of “property” in the Constitution, it must also thereby
sometimes mandate a meaning not in accord with the plain meaning of the word.
202 See Llewellyn, supra note 184, at 404.
203 See supra Part I.
204 See supra Part III.
205 See, e.g., Scott Dodson, A Darwinist View of the Living Constitution, 61 VAND. L. REV.
1319, 1322–25 (2008) (surveying various theories of living constitutionalism).
206 See supra text accompanying notes 1–21.
207 See supra text accompanying notes 138–40.
208 See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (dealing with copyrights); Act of
April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (dealing with patents).
209 Justin Hughes, A Short History of “Intellectual Property” in Relation to Copyright
28–31 (Cardozo Legal Studies Research, Working Paper No. 265, 2011), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1432860.
210 For some evidence of the first proposition, see Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d
1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (declining to recognize patent rights as property protected by a
Takings Clause claim against the United States government), and Gal-Or v. United States, 97
Fed. Cl. 476, 480 (2011) (citing Zoltek to dismiss plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment takings claims).
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Both living constitutionalism and originalism, the two main contenders for the
title of reigning theory of constitutional interpretation, thus admit the possibility (and
sometimes embrace the actuality) that the meaning of “property” in the Constitution
varies from ordinary usage and from clause to clause in the text. That should trouble
anyone concerned about the rule of law, to say nothing of elegance and logic.
Happily, there exists a third alternative: Give “property” its plain, present, public
meaning everywhere it appears in the Constitution. On that view, the word would
have its ordinary and broad meaning, comprising both real and personal prop-
erty—but excluding mere statutory privileges—in each of its four constitutional
appearances. For now, though, that approach to the Constitution remains largely
unknown and undeveloped.211
V. THE VIEW FROM THE THIRD AMENDMENT
The jurisprudence of the Third Amendment has seen little activity in the twenty-
odd years since this fine Journal last published my thoughts on the topic.212 This
Part briefly surveys the new caselaw and commentary, before revealing what
amounts to a blockbuster in this somewhat neglected field: a hitherto
unnoted—though, in retrospect quite blatant—violation of the Third Amendment
that occurred in the Aleutian Islands during World War II. The sad particulars
surrounding that unconstitutional quartering do more than remind us of the Third
Amendment’s continuing (if attenuated) relevance; however, they also illustrate why
the Founders doubtless meant to include chattels within the scope of the Taking
Clause, and why we should continue today to give “property,” as used in the
Constitution, its plain and broad meaning.213
In updating my research, I uncovered only one new case interpreting the Third
Amendment since I last canvassed the field: Custer County Action Association v.
Garvey,214 wherein the petitioners complained of military aircraft flying through the
airspace above their properties.215 “Judicial interpretation of the Third Amendment
is nearly nonexistent,” admitted the court.216 It found guidance, however, in
Engblom v. Carey,217 a case that has given the amendment sustained attention.218
The Engblom court held that “property-based privacy interests protected by the
Third Amendment are not limited solely to those arising out of fee simple ownership
211 For an attempt at its development, see Bell, supra note 177, at 55–67 (arguing for
interpretation of the Constitution according to its plain, present, public meaning in order to
maximize the consent of the governed).
212 Bell, supra note 16, at 117–18.
213 See Rubenfeld, supra note 137, at 1122–23.
214 256 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 2001).
215 Id. at 1027.
216 Id. at 1043.
217 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982).
218 See id. For my earlier article’s discussion of Engblom, see Bell, supra note 16, at 142–43.
1270 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1243
but extend to those recognized and permitted by society as founded on lawful oc-
cupation or possession with a legal right to exclude others.”219 Applying that principle
to the claims before it, the court in Custer County held that the petitioners’ exclusive
rights did not extend to navigable airspace over their land.220 Ironically or not, the court
concluded: “We simply do not believe the Framers intended the Third Amendment
to be used to prevent the military from regulated, lawful use of airspace above
private property without the property owners’ consent.”221 Unhappily for the refine-
ment of Third Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.222
Outside the caselaw, the Third Amendment has, in recent years, occasionally
popped up in bizarre (and therefore futile) complaints,223 and in humorous riffs about
the Amendment’s seeming irrelevance.224 Scholars have given it more serious but
speculative treatment, suggesting that the Third Amendment might apply to U.S.
troops lodged on foreign soil,225 to military recruiting on college campuses,226 and to the
Endangered Species Act.227 Commentators have argued that the Third Amendment’s
concern for homes suggests special treatment for homes under the Takings Clause.228
Assessments of the Third Amendment have ranged from dismissing it as “an
interesting study in constitutional obsolescence,”229 to this timely warning, well
219 Engblom, 677 F.2d at 962.
220 256 F.3d at 1042–44.
221 Id. at 1043.
222 Custer Cnty. Action Ass’n v. Garvey, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002).
223 See, e.g., Am. Fork City v. Smith, 258 P.3d 634, 636 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) (declining
to address the plaintiff’s claim that having obtained his phone records violated his Third
Amendment rights).
224 See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, Mitch Daniels vs. The Thirders, THE NEW REPUBLIC (May 18,
2011, 11:15 AM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-chait/88617/mitch-daniels-vs-the
-thirders (criticizing the plan of would-be presidential candidate Mitch Daniels to sleep in
voters’ homes during his campaign). For continuing, but relatively sparse, coverage of Third
Amendment news, see Jay Wexler, ODD CLAUSES WATCH, http://oddclauses.wordpress.com
/category/third-amendment/ (last visited May 1, 2012).
225 See Kaimipono D. Wenger, Armenian Genocide and the Third Amendment,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Sept. 13, 2011, 1:31 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com
/archives/2011/09/armenian-genocide-and-the-third-amendment.html (discussing the Third
Amendment’s application to complaints that the Incirlik Air Base quarters U.S. troops on
“property seized by Turkey during the Armenian genocide”).
226 See Geoffrey M. Wyatt, The Third Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Military
Recruiting on Private Campuses, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 113 (2005) (arguing that the Third
Amendment limits military recruiting on private campuses).
227 See Andrew P. Morriss & Richard L. Stroup, Quartering Species: The “Living
Constitution,” the Third Amendment, and the Endangered Species Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 769
(2000) (arguing that the Endangered Species Act effectuates an unconstitutional “quartering”
of species on private land).
228 Thomas G. Sprankling, Note, Does Five Equal Three? Reading the Takings Clause in
Light of the Third Amendment’s Protection of Houses, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 112 (2012).
229 Morton J. Horwitz, Is the Third Amendment Obsolete?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 209, 212
(1991). But see Robert A. Gross, Public and Private in the Third Amendment, 26 VAL. U.L.
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founded in light of many apparent (but nonetheless unlitigated) instances of the
quartering of National Guard troops following Hurricane Katrina: “If Americans
ignore the Third Amendment, or dismiss it as trivial, they implicitly condone
military incursion into their homes during domestic disasters when the rule of law
has failed.”230 The Third Amendment has even touched the heights of constitutional
theory; Professor Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz explained in a recent article that the
Third Amendment’s use of the passive voice makes it “grammatically and structur-
ally, a model for the rest of the Bill of Rights.”231
Though I do not go quite so far as Professor Rosenkranz in describing the
proper scope of the Third Amendment’s influence, I will argue that it can teach us
about the scope of “property” in the Takings Clause in particular and throughout the
Constitution in general. The lesson begins with a surprising, and more than a little
distressing, tale of hitherto unremarked quartering.232 In 1942, as Japanese forces
swept across the Aleutian Islands off of Alaska’s far southwestern coast, United
States officials evacuated natives from the region and moved in military equipment
and personnel.233 Among the many (and typically worse) abuses the natives suffered
was at least one instance of quartering, which occurred when “a small Army force
was sent to the Pribilofs on September 19[, 1942], billeted in the departed villagers’
dwellings, and ordered to construct an airstrip.”234
It bears emphasizing that the native Aleutians suffered wrongs worse than mere
quartering. They were forcibly removed from their homes and interned in distant and
unhealthy camps, an ordeal during which “[t]hey fell victim to an extraordinarily high
death rate, losing many of the elders who sustained their culture.”235 Worried about
Japanese invaders, and pursuing a “scorched-earth policy,” the United States
military completely destroyed some evacuated villages.236 Other empty villages,
REV. 215 (1991) (responding to Horwitz with an argument for the continuing relevance of
the Third Amendment).
230 See James P. Rogers, Note, Third Amendment Protections in Domestic Disasters, 17
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 747, 750 (2008). Rogers makes a convincing case that National
Guard troops’ behavior following Hurricane Katrina resulted in many Third Amendment
violations. Id. at 761–78.
231 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005,
1030, 1033 (2011).
232 I first learned about this remarkable historical episode in White’s The Lost Internment,
supra note 1. That work does not mention any instances of quartering, however. That, I
discovered only by studying the official report on the incident, prepared well after the fact
and with an air of contrition. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3. Most of that
report—the majority of Part I—concerns the internment of Japanese Americans on the West
Coast. Id. at 25–282, 295–301. The much shorter Part II focuses on the evacuation and
internment of the natives of the Aleutian Islands. Id. at 315–59.
233 PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 318–31.
234 Id. at 330.
235 Id. at 318.
236 Id. at 328–29.
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though left standing, “were pillaged and ransacked by American military
personnel.”237 When, approximately one year later, the Aleuts were finally returned
to their homes, “All household effects and equipment the Aleuts had left behind
were missing.”238 The occupying forces took more than just the market value of the
destroyed property. As reported in Personal Justice Denied, the official report of the
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, “[t]hrough the
insult of massive looting and vandalism of their homes and places of worship by
American military forces, the Aleuts lost invaluable tangible ties to their past.
Houses can eventually be rebuilt and refurnished, but stolen family mementos,
heirlooms and religious icons . . . cannot be recovered.”239 Quartering was not the
only, nor the worst, thing that the Aleuts suffered at the hands of their government.
On any fair accounting, though, the Aleuts did suffer unconstitutional quarter-
ing. Note first that the natives of the Aleutians enjoyed all the constitutional rights
of other Americans. The Supreme Court has held that “the Constitution applies in
full in incorporated Territories surely destined for statehood,”240 a classification that
Alaska doubtless satisfied in 1942.241 Beyond even that, the natives of the Aleutians
would have enjoyed the “guaranties of certain fundamental personal rights declared
in the Constitution” that the Supreme Court provided as early as 1922—including
rights expressly protected by the Third Amendment.242
Did that 1942 quartering of troops in the homes of Aleutian natives violate the
Third Amendment? Consider the provision in full: “No Soldier shall, in time of
peace, be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of
war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”243 By 1942, the United States had
entered into a “time of war” with Japan,244 making the second clause of the Third
Amendment applicable. But lawmakers evidently passed no statute regulating the
quartering of soldiers on the natives of the Aleutian Islands. The Amendment’s
closing mandate—“in a manner to be prescribed by law”245—therefore went unmet,
giving rise to a violation of the Third Amendment.
237 Id. at 318.
238 Id. at 356.
239 Id. at 359.
240 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757 (2008).
241 Alaska was incorporated as a territory in 1912. See Eric Gislason, A Brief History of
Alaska Statehood (1897–1959), ST. OF ALASKA, http://www.gov.alaska.gov/ASCC/pdf
/HistoryofAlaska.pdf (last visited May 1, 2012).
242 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922). This case concerned constitutional
rights of a defendant in ‘Porto’ Rico, but the Court compared the case to Alaska. Alaska was
incorporated into the Union, and therefore people living in Alaska had constitutional
guarantees. Id. at 309.
243 U.S. CONST. amend. III.
244 PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 47.
245 U.S. CONST. amend. III.
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Far from following a manner prescribed by law, much of the evacuation and
internment was executed in a slapdash and ad hoc manner, in the heat of war and far
from officials on the mainland.246 Personal Justice Denied noted that “the govern-
ment agencies (the Department of the Interior and the military) responsible for
protecting the Aleut residents failed to coordinate their activities internally or with
each other.”247 Nor did contemporary officials set things right once the immediate
threat of Japanese attack had passed. “The evacuated Aleuts suffered material losses
for which they were never fully recompensed, either in kind or in cash,” and offi-
cials interviewed after the fact “did not recall any expectation that the Aleuts’
personal possessions would be replaced or that some type of monetary compensation
would be received.”248
The federal government thus unlawfully quartered soldiers in the Aleuts’
dwellings and, through the depredations of the occupying soldiers, took private
property without providing just compensation.249 That much we can tell from the
facts. But though the Commission reported facts that let us call the Aleuts’ evacua-
tion and internment unconstitutional, the Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians did not name any legal wrongs,250 nor did the Aleutian and
Pribilof Islands Restitution Act,251 passed in response to the Commission’s report,
explain why the federal government was offering compensation to wronged
Aleutians.252 To the contrary, the Act made recipients of its largess agree to a blanket
waiver of “all claims against the United States arising out of the relocation” they had
suffered.253 Each qualifying native willing to make that concession qualified for a
payment of $12,000.254
What does all this have to do with “property” in the Constitution? Note the sorts
of wrongs that the relocated Aleuts suffered to their personal property: destruction
by arson and malice, theft by ill-disciplined soldiers, and sacrilege of objects
246 PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 318–19 (explaining that “the evacuation
of the Aleuts was not planned in a timely or thoughtful manner,” and was marked by
“official indifference”).
247 Id. at 323; see also id. at 326–28 (describing confusion and neglect of duty among
responsible government officials).
248 Id. at 356–57 (footnote omitted).
249 The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians found a
contemporary entry in the federal budget of $31,441 for “refunds, award and indemnities”
but could not find any additional information on the expenditures, and obviously regarded
it as grossly insufficient to cover the natives’ losses. Id. at 357.
250 Neither was the Commission directed to reach legal conclusions; rather, it was tasked
solely with collecting the facts and recommending a remedy. Id. at 1 (describing the
Commission’s mandate).
251 The Aleutian and Pribilof Islands Restitution Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §1989c (2006).
252 See id.; see also Brooks, supra note 21.
253 App. § 1989c-5(e) (“The payment to an eligible Aleut under this section shall be in full
satisfaction of all claims against the United States arising out of the relocation.”).
254 Id.
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honoring family and religion.255 All qualify as foreseeable results of loosing armed
and uprooted young men upon civilian populations. The founding generation knew
those, the characteristic marks of quartering, all too well. They ratified the Third
Amendment to prevent such offenses and the Fifth Amendment to remedy them.256
The prospect of quartering inspired fear and outrage in Colonial Americans not
simply, or even primarily, because they feared the loss of implied leasehold rents.
Quartered troops represented a more pointed threat to persons and personal
property.257 Consider, for instance, Joseph Galloway’s plea, warning his fellow
Americans that rebellion would bring war, that war would bring quartering, and that
quartering would find soldiers “travelling [sic] over your estates, entering your
houses—your castles . . . seizing your property . . . ravishing your wives and
daughters, and afterwards plunging the dagger into their tender bosoms.”258
In a reversal of the scenario painted by the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,259 it thus seems likely that concern for the protection of personal
property, rather than of real property, originally inspired the Takings Clause. As
Galloway’s warning illustrates, the threat that quartering posed to real property—
loss of leasehold values and damage to buildings—probably counted among the
least of the concerns that the Third Amendment aimed to address.260 And while the
historical record leaves much about the motivations behind the drafting of the
Takings Clause obscure, Henry St. George Tucker described it as “intended to
restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the army, and
other public uses, by impressment . . . without any compensation whatever.”261 The
Founders thus probably meant the Takings Clause to remedy, foremost among other
wrongs, the taking of personal property by quartered troops.
Originalists should find that argument persuasion enough to give real and chattel
property equal treatment under the Takings Clause. Those who prefer a more
flexible approach to constitutional interpretation, one designed to keep it in step with
modern needs, should take due note of the offenses committed against the Aleuts
during World War II. The federal government eventually admitted that it had acted
wrongly and paid compensation.262 The entire tragedy might have been avoided,
255 See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 359.
256 See supra Part III.C (discussing the Takings Clause).
257 B. Carmon Hardy, A Free People’s Intolerable Grievance, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
LIVELY HERITAGE 67, 67–68, 79–81 (Jon Kukla ed., 1987).
258 Id. at 79 (1987) (quoting Joseph Galloway and explaining the context of his comments)
(alterations in original).
259 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
260 See Hardy, supra note 257, at 79–81 (discussing the rationale for the Amendment).
261 TUCKER, supra note 137, at 305–06; see also Rubenfeld, supra note 137, at 1122–23
(identifying the taking of supplies by quartered troops as being among the “paradigm[atic]
case[s]” that the Founders meant for the Takings Clause to remedy).
262 See The Aleutian and Pribilof Island Restitution Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §1989c-2, 4
(establishing the Aleutian and Pribilof Island Restitution Fund and compensating Aleuts for
their World War II deprivations).
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however, if the Aleuts had been able to invoke the plain meaning of the Constitution,
limiting quartering to that which was done in a lawful manner, and winning just
compensation for all private property—personal and real—lost to occupying
soldiers. Those who want to give the Constitution a living meaning should care
about what it means to those who live under it.
CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY BY COMMON CONSENT
The evacuation and occupation of the Aleutian Islands during World War II
shows only too well the results of ignoring the Constitution’s words. Though the
federal government quartered soldiers, contrary to the plain meaning of the Third
Amendment, it seems nobody has noticed until now. And though the Aleuts’ lost
chattels fully qualified as “private property,” officials never admitted to violating the
Takings Clause and took over forty years to pay any compensation.263 We can
explain (if not excuse) the former oversight as a consequence of the Third Amend-
ment’s obscurity. But how could anyone have overlooked so massive a violation of
the Takings Clause? Perhaps confusion over the scope of constitutional property
bears some of the blame.
As this Article has documented, courts and commentators have cast undue
uncertainty on the meaning of “property” in the Constitution.264 They have tortured
the word’s four textual appearances into four—or, on one accounting, five—distinct
meanings.265 Such a disjointed interpretation cannot help but obscure the bold truth
about our constitutional rights. We do not have to wonder whether that legal
befuddlement might have tragic results; the wartime treatment of the Aleuts gives
proof enough.
Adding irony to tragedy, the Aleuts went uncompensated for the very type of
wrong that inspired the Takings Clause: occupying soldiers’ stealing and destroying
personal property.266 The plain text of the Constitution required that the Aleuts
receive just compensation for the loss of their chattels in like circumstances.267
Given the historical background of the Takings Clause, true originalists should
likewise read it to protect chattels (Justice Scalia’s dicta in Lucas to the contrary
notwithstanding).268 What about those who aim to keep the Constitution alive by
263 See White, supra note 1, at 297–99. Compensation was not provided until August 10,
1988, with the passing of the Aleutian and Pribilof Island Restitution Act. 50 U.S.C. app.
§1989c (2006).
264 See supra Parts I–III.
265 The word “property” appears in Article IV, section 3, clause 2, the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For relevant discussion, see supra Part I.
266 See White, supra note 1, at 297–99.
267 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
268 See supra text accompanying notes 181–85. For Justice Scalia’s opinion, see Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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reading it flexibly? They should learn from the Aleuts’ maltreatment how the least
advantaged among us benefit the most from steadfast respect for property rights.
Given that poorer people are less likely to own much wealth in the form of real
property, a just Constitution must protect chattel property to the utmost.
Even apart from the Constitution’s plain language, its original meaning, and our
concern for the poor, personal property deserves our highest regard. Unlike real
property, personal property does not typically come freighted with claims, dating
back to feudal law, that title ultimately vests in the King or other sovereign. There
can be no more absolute form of fee simple absolute than that which we enjoy in
personal property—a form of property that can arise quite literally out of thin air.269
How curious, then, that some authority treats personal property as less deserving of
protection under the Takings Clause than real property.270
In the grand struggle to protect individual rights against government trespass,
the Third Amendment plays a role akin to the provision in Van Halen’s standard
performance contract, requiring that a bowl of M&Ms be placed in the band’s
hospitality room with all the brown M&Ms removed.271 Though sometimes touted
as an example of rock star excess, the clause in fact served to test whether the band’s
contractual partner, provider of the concert venue, had read the terms of their
agreement.272 Finding brown M&Ms backstage warned Van Halen to look out for
more serious breaches, such as those related to the contract’s provisions on “light-
ing, staging, security, and ticketing.”273 Quartering serves as a forbidden M&M in
the Constitution’s bowl of rights, and violations of the Third Amendment signal
more serious problems. Consider that government officials violated the Third
Amendment during the War of 1812, the Civil War, World War II, during a 1979
New York prison guards’ strike,274 and Hurricane Katrina. Consider, and worry.275
Disrespect for the Third Amendment shows a more general and dangerous
disregard for property rights. The Constitution’s protections of property have served
us long and well, and today they still sharply limit state power. In recent years,
however, wayward threads of judicial precedent have infected the law of constitu-
tional property with dangerous inconsistencies and manifest absurdities. The time
has come to shake off those misreadings, view the text with fresh eyes, and give
“property” its plain and broad meaning throughout the Constitution.
269 Consider someone drawing oxygen from the atmosphere, bottling it, and selling it.
270 See supra Part III.C.2 (describing Takings Clause jurisprudence).
271 See 1982 Van Halen Tour Rider 40 (1982) (“M&M’s (WARNING: ABSOLUTELY
NO BROWN ONES)”), available at http://www.thesmokinggun.com/file/van-halens
-legendary-mms-rider?page=8 (last visited May 1, 2012).
272 See Brown Out, SNOPES, http://www.snopes.com/music/artists/vanhalen.asp (last
visited May 1, 2012) (providing background on the Van Halen clause).
273 Van Halen’s Legendary M&M’s Rider, supra note 271; see also Brown Out, supra
note 272.
274 See Bell, supra note 16, at 136–39, 142–43.
275 Rogers, supra 230 at 761–68.
